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Abstract
We study an abstract optimal auction problem for a single good or service. This problem
includes environments where agents have budgets, risk preferences, or multi-dimensional prefer-
ences over several possible configurations of the good (furthermore, it allows an agent’s budget
and risk preference to be known only privately to the agent). These are the main challenge
areas for auction theory. A single-agent problem is to optimize a given objective subject to a
constraint on the maximum probability with which each type is allocated, a.k.a., an allocation
rule. Our approach is a reduction from multi-agent mechanism design problem to collection of
single-agent problems. We focus on maximizing revenue, but our results can be applied to other
objectives (e.g., welfare).
An optimal multi-agent mechanism can be computed by a linear/convex program on interim
allocation rules by simultaneously optimizing several single-agent mechanisms subject to joint
feasibility of the allocation rules. For single-unit auctions, Border (1991) showed that the space
of all jointly feasible interim allocation rules for n agents is a D-dimensional convex polytope
which can be specified by 2D linear constraints, where D is the total number of all agents’
types. Consequently, efficiently solving the mechanism design problem requires a separation
oracle for the feasibility conditions and also an algorithm for ex-post implementation of the
interim allocation rules. We show that the polytope of jointly feasible interim allocation rules
is the projection of a higher dimensional polytope which can be specified by only O(D2) linear
constraints. Furthermore, our proof shows that finding a preimage of the interim allocation
rules in the higher dimensional polytope immediately gives an ex-post implementation.
We generalize Border’s result to the case of k-unit and matroid auctions. For these problems
we give a separation-oracle based algorithm for optimizing over feasible interim allocation rules
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and a randomized rounding algorithm for ex post implementation. These ex post implemen-
tations have a simple form; they are randomizations over simple greedy mechanisms. Given a
ordered subset of agent types, such a greedy mechanisms serves types in the specified order.
1 Introduction
Classical economics and game theory give fundamental characterizations of the structure of compet-
itive behavior. For instance, Nash’s (1951) theorem shows that mixed equilibrium gives a complete
description of strategic behavior, and the Arrow-Debreu (1954) theorem shows the existence of
market clearing prices in multi-party exchanges. In these environments computational complexity
has offered further perspective. In particular, mixed equilibrium in general games can be compu-
tationally hard to find (Chen and Deng, 2006; Daskalakis et al., 2009), whereas market clearing
prices are often easy to find (Devanur et al., 2008; Jain, 2004). In this paper we investigate an anal-
ogous condition for auction theory due to Kim Border (1991), give a computationally constructive
generalization that further illuminates the structure of auctions, and thereby show that the theory
of optimal auctions is tractable.
Consider an abstract optimal auction problem. A seller faces a set of agents. Each agent desires
service and there may be multiple ways to serve each agent (e.g., when renting a car, you can get
a GPS or not, you can get various insurance packages, and you will pay a total price). Each agent
has preferences over the different possible ways she can be served and we refer to this preference as
her type. The seller is restricted by the feasibility constraint that at most one agent can be served
(e.g., only one car in the rental shop). When the agents’ types are drawn independently from a
known prior distribution, the seller would like to design an auction to optimize her objective, e.g.,
revenue, in expectation over this distribution, subject to feasibility. Importantly, in this abstract
problem we have not made any of the following standard assumptions on the agents’ preferences:
quasi-linearity, risk-neutrality, or single-dimensionality.
We assume that agents behave strategically and we will analyze an auction’s performance in
Bayes-Nash equilibrium, i.e., where each agent’s strategy is a best response to the other agents’
strategies and the distribution over their preferences. Without loss of generality the revelation
principle (Myerson, 1981) allows for the restriction of attention to Bayesian incentive compatible
(BIC) mechanisms, i.e., ones where the truthtelling strategy is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
Any auction the seller proposes can be decomposed across the agents as follows. From an
agent’s perspective, the other agents are random draws from the known distribution. Therefore,
the composition of these random draws (as inputs), the bid of the agent, and the mechanism induce
an interim allocation rule which specifies the probability the agent is served as a function of her
bid. BIC implies that the agent is at least as happy to bid her type as any other bid.
Applying the same argument to each agent induces a profile of interim allocation rules. These
interim allocation rules are jointly feasible in the sense that there exists an auction that, for the prior
distribution, induces them. As an example, suppose an agent’s type is high or low with probability
1/2 each. Consider two interim allocation rules: rule (a) serves the agent with probability one when
her type is high and with probability zero otherwise, and rule (b) serves the agent with probability
1/2 regardless of her type. It is feasible for both agents to have rule (b) or for one agent to have
rule (a) and the other to have rule (b); on the other hand, it is infeasible for both agents to have
rule (a). This last combination is infeasible because with probability one quarter both agents have
high types but we cannot simultaneously serve both of them. An important question in the general
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theory of auctions is to decide when a profile of interim allocation rules is feasible, and furthermore,
when it is feasible, to find an auction that implements it.
A structural characterization of the necessary and sufficient conditions for the aforementioned
interim feasibility is important for the construction of optimal auctions as it effectively allows the
auction problem to be decomposed across agents. If we can optimally serve a single agent for a
given interim allocation rule and we can check feasibility of a profile of interim allocation rules,
then we can optimize over auctions. Effectively, we can reduce the multi-agent auction problem to
a collection of single-agent auction problems.
We now informally describe Border’s (1991) characterization of interim feasibility. A profile
of interim allocation rules is implementable if for any subspace of the agent types the expected
number of items served to agents in this subspace is at most the probability that there is an agent
with type in this subspace. Returning to our infeasible example above, the probability that there
is an agent with a high type is 3/4 while the expected number of items served to agents with high
types is one; Border’s condition is violated.
The straightforward formulation of interim feasibility via Border’s characterization has expo-
nentially many constraints. Nonetheless, it can be simplified to a polynomial number of constraints
in single-item auctions with symmetric agents (where the agents’ type space and distribution are
identical). This simplification of the characterization has lead to an analytically tractable theory of
auctions when agents have budgets (Laffont and Robert, 1996) or are risk averse (Matthews, 1984;
Maskin and Riley, 1984).
Results Our main theorem is to show computationally tractable (i.e., in polynomial time in the
total number of agents’ types) methods for each of the following problems. First, a given profile of
interim allocation rules can be checked for interim feasibility. Second, for any feasible profile of in-
terim allocation rules, an auction (i.e., ex post allocation rule) that induces these interim allocation
rules can be constructed. In particular, for problems where the seller can serve at most one agent,
we show that the exponentially-faceted polytope specified by the interim feasibility constraints is
a projection of a quadratically-faceted polytope in a higher dimension, and an ex post allocation
rule implementing a feasible profile of interim allocation rules is given immediately by the latter’s
preimage in the higher dimensional polytope. In particular, this implies that optimal interim allo-
cation rules can be computed by solving a quadratically sized linear/convex program. These results
combine to give a (computationally tractable) reduction from the multi-agent auction problem to
a collection of single-agent problems. Furthermore, our algorithmic procedure characterizes every
single service auction as implementable by a simple token passing game.
We also generalize the interim feasibility characterization and use it to design optimal auctions
for the cases where the seller faces a k-unit feasibility constraint, i.e., at most k agents can be
served, and more generally to matroid feasibility constraints. Our generalization of the feasibility
characterization is based on a simpler network-flow-based approach. Although the number of
constraints in this characterization is exponential in the sizes of type spaces, we observe that
the constraints define a polymatroid, whose vertices correspond to particularly simple auctions
which can be implemented by simple determinist allocation rules based on ranking. Algorithms for
submodular function minimization give rise to fast separation oracles which, given a set of interim
allocation rules, detect a violated feasibility constraint whenever there is one; expressing any point
in the polymatroid as a convex combination of the vertices allows us to implement any feasible
interim allocation rule as a distribution over the simple auctions. These enable us again to reduce
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the multi-agent problem to single-agent problems.
Auction theory is very poorly understood outside the standard single-dimensional quasi-linear
revenue maximization environment of Myerson (1981). The main consequence of this work is
that even without analytical understanding, optimal auctions can be computationally solved for
in environments that include non-quasi-linear utility (e.g., budgets or risk aversion) and multi-
dimensional preferences (assuming that the corresponding single-agent problem can be solved).
Furthermore, unlike most work in auction theory with budgets or risk-aversion, our framework
permits the budgets or risk parameters to be private to the agents.
Related Work Myerson (1981) characterized Bayesian optimal auctions in environments with
quasi-linear risk-neutral single-dimensional agent preferences. Bulow and Roberts (1989) reinter-
preted Myerson’s approach as reducing the multi-agent auction problem to a related single-agent
problem. Our work generalize this reduction-based approach to single-item multi-unit auction
problems with general preferences.
An important aspect of our approach is that it can be applied to general multi-dimensional agent
preferences. Multi-dimensional preferences can arise as distinct values different configurations of
the good or service being auctioned, in specifying a private budget and a private value, or in
specifying preferences over risk. We briefly review related work for agent preferences with multiple
values, budgets, or risk parameters.
Multi-dimensional valuations are well known to be difficult. For example, Rochet and Chone
(1998), showed that, because bunching1 can not be ruled out easily, the optimal auctions for multi-
dimensional valuations are dramatically different from those for single dimensional valuations. Be-
cause of this, most results are for cases with special structure (e.g., Armstrong, 1996; Wilson, 1994;
McAfee and McMillan, 1988) and often, by using such structures, reduce the problems to single-
dimensional ones (e.g., Spence, 1980; Roberts, 1979; Mirman and Sibley, 1980). Our framework
does not need any such structure.
A number of papers consider optimal auctions for agents with budgets (see, e.g., Pai and
Vohra, 2008; Che and Gale, 1995; Maskin, 2000). These papers rely on budgets being public or
the agents being symmetric; our technique allows for a non-identical prior distribution and private
budgets. Mechanism design with risk averse agents was studied by Maskin and Riley (1984) and
Matthews (1983). Both works assume i.i.d. prior distributions and have additional assumptions on
risk attitudes; our reduction does not require these assumptions.
Our work is also related to a line of work on approximating the Bayesian optimal mechanism.
These works tend to look for simple mechanisms that give constant (e.g., two) approximations
to the optimal mechanism. Chawla et al. (2007), Briest et al. (2010), and Cai and Daskalakis
(2011) consider item pricing and lottery pricing for a single agent; the first two give constant
approximations the last gives a (1 + )-approximation for any . These problems are related to
the single-agent problems we consider. Chawla et al. (2010) and Bhattacharya et al. (2010) extend
these approaches to multi-agent auction problems. The point of view of reduction from multi-
to single-agent presented in this paper bears close relationship to recent work by Alaei (2011)
who gives a reduction from multi- to single-agent mechanism design that loses at most a constant
factor of the objective. Our reductions, employing entirely different techniques, give rise to optimal
mechanisms instead of approximations thereof.
1Bunching refers to the situation in which a group of distinct types are treated the same way in by the mechanism.
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Characterization of interim feasibility plays a vital role in this work. For single-item single-
unit auctions, necessary and sufficient conditions for interim feasibility were developed through a
series of works (Maskin and Riley, 1984; Matthews, 1984; Border, 1991, 2007; Mierendorff, 2011);
this characterization has proved useful for deriving properties of mechanisms, Manelli and Vincent
(2010) being a recent example. Border (1991) characterized symmetric interim feasible auctions for
single-item auctions with identically distributed agent preferences. His characterization is based on
the definition of “hierarchical auctions.” He observes that the space of interim feasible mechanisms
is given by a polytope, where vertices of this polytope corresponding to hierarchical auctions, and
interior points corresponding to convex combinations of vertices. Mierendorff (2011) generalize
Border’s approach and characterization to asymmetric single-item auctions. The characterization
via hierarchical auctions differs from our characterization via ordered subset auctions in that hi-
erarchical auctions allow for some types to be relatively unordered with the semantics that these
unordered types will be considered in a random order; it is important to allow for this when
solving for symmetric auctions. Of course convex combinations over hierarchical auctions and or-
dered subset auctions provide the same generality. Our work generalizes the characterization from
asymmetric single-unit auctions to asymmetric multi-unit and matroid auctions.
Our main result provides computational foundations to the interim feasibility characterizations
discussed above. We show that interim feasibility can be checked, that interim feasible allocation
rules can be optimized over, and that corresponding ex post implementations can be found. Inde-
pendently and contemporaneously Cai et al. (2012) provided similar computational foundations for
the single-unit auction problem. Their approach to the single-unit auction problem is most com-
parable to our approach for the multi-unit and matroid auction problems where the optimization
problem is written as a convex program which can be solved by the ellipsoid method; while these
methods result in strongly polynomial time algorithms they are not considered practical. In con-
trast, our single-unit approach, when the single-agent problems can be solved by a linear program,
gives a single linear program which can be practically solved.
While our work gives computationally tractable interim feasibility characterizations in “service
based” environments like multi-unit auctions and matroid auctions; Cai et al. (2012) generalize the
approach to multi-item auctions with agents with additive preferences. The problem of designing
an optimal auction for agents with multi-dimensional additive preferences is considered one of the
main challenges for auction theory and their result, from a computational perspective, solves this
problem.
Organization. In Section 2 we describe single- and multi-agent mechanism design problems.
In Section 3 we give algorithms for solving two kinds of single-agent problems: multi-item unit-
demand preferences and private-value private-budget preferences. In Section 4, we give a high-level
description of the multi- to single-agent reduction which allows for efficiently compute optimal
mechanisms for many service based environments. The key step therein, an efficient algorithm that
implements any jointly feasible set of interim allocation rules, is presented in Section 5. This section
is divided into three parts which address single-unit, multi-unit, and matroid feasibility constraints,
respectively. Conclusions and extensions are discussed in Section 6.
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2 Preliminaries
Single-agent Mechanisms We consider the provisioning of an abstract service. This service
may be parameterized by an attribute, e.g., quality of service, and may be accompanied by a
required payment. We denote the outcome obtained by an agent as w ∈W . We view this outcome
as giving an indicator for whether or not an agent is served and as describing attributes of the
service such as quality of service and monetary payments. Let Alloc(w) ∈ {0, 1} be an indicator for
whether the agent is served or not; let Payment(w) ∈ R denote any payment the agent is required to
make. In a randomized environment (e.g., randomness from a randomized mechanism or Bayesian
environment) the outcome an agent receives is a random variable from a distribution over W . The
space of all such distributions is denoted ∆(W ).
The agent has a type t from a finite type space T . This type is drawn from distribution
f ∈ ∆(T ) and we equivalently denote by f the probability mass function. I.e., for every t ∈ T ,
f(t) is the probability that the type is t. The utility function u : T ×W → R maps the agent’s
type and the outcome to real valued utility. The agent is a von Neumann–Morgenstern expected
utility maximizer and we extend u to ∆(W ) linearly, i.e., for w ∈ ∆(W ), u(t, w) is the expectation
of u where the outcome is drawn according to w. We do not require the usual assumption of
quasi-linearity.
A single-agent mechanism, without loss of generality by the revelation principle, is just an
outcome rule, a mapping from the agent’s type to a distribution over outcomes. We denote an
outcome rule by w : T → ∆(W ). We say that an outcome rule w is incentive compatible (IC) and
individually rational (IR) if for all t, t′ ∈ T , respectively,
u(t, w(t)) ≥ u(t, w(t′)), (IC)
u(t, w(t)) ≥ 0. (IR)
We refer to restriction of the outcome rule to the indicator for service as the allocation rule.
As the allocation to each agent is a binary random variable, distributions over allocations are fully
described by their expected value. Therefore the allocation rule x : T → [0, 1] for a given outcome
rule w is x(t) = E
[
Alloc(w(t))
]
.
We give two examples to illustrate the abstract model described above. The first example is the
standard quasi-linear risk-neutral preference which is prevalent in auction theory. Here the agent’s
type space is T ⊂ R+ where t ∈ T represents the agent’s valuation for the item. The outcome space
is W = {0, 1} × R+ where an outcome w in this space indicates whether or not the item is sold to
the agent, by Alloc(w), and at what price, by Payment(w). The agent’s quasi-linear utility function
is u(t, w) = t ·Alloc(w)−Payment(w). The second example is that of an m-item unit-demand (also
quasi-linear and risk-neutral) preference. Here the type space is T ⊂ Rm+ and a type t ∈ T indicates
the agent’s valuation for each of the items when the agent’s value for no service is normalized to
zero. An outcome space is W = {0, . . . ,m} × R+. The first coordinate of w specifies which item
the agent receives or none and Alloc(w) = 1 if it is non-zero; the second coordinate of w specifies
the required payment Payment(w). The agent’s utility for w is the value the agent attains for the
item received less her payment. Beyond these two examples, our framework can easily incorporate
more general agent preferences exhibiting, e.g., risk aversion or a budget limit.
Consider the following single-agent mechanism design problem. A feasibility constraint is given
by an upper bound x(t) on the probability that the agent is served as a function of her type t;
the distribution on types in T is given by f . The single-agent problem is to find the outcome rule
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w∗ that satisfies the allocation constraint of x and maximizes the performance, e.g., revenue. This
problem is described by the following program:
max
w
: Et∼f,w(t)
[
Payment(w(t))
]
(SP)
s.t. Ew(t)
[
Alloc(w(t))
] ≤ x(t), ∀t ∈ T
w is IC and IR.
We denote the outcome rule w∗ that optimizes this program by Outcome(x) and its revenue by
Rev(x) = Et∼f,w∗(t)
[
Payment(w∗(t))
]
. We note that, although this paper focuses on revenue
maximization, the same techniques presented can be applied to maximize (or minimize) general
separable objectives such as social welfare.
Multi-agent Mechanisms There are n independent agents. Agents need not be identical, i.e.,
agent i’s type space is Ti, the probability mass function for her type is fi, her outcome space is
Wi, and her utility function is ui. The profile of agent types is denoted by t = (t1, . . . , tn) ∈
T1×· · ·×Tn = T, the joint distribution on types is f ∈ ∆(T1)×· · ·×∆(Tn), a vector of outcomes is
(w1, · · · , wn) ∈W, and an allocation is (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n. The mechanism has an inter-agent
feasibility constraint that permits serving at most k agents, i.e.,
∑
i xi ≤ k.2 A mechanism that
obeys this constraint is feasible. The mechanism has no inter-agent constraint on attributes or
payments.
A mechanism maps type profiles to a (distribution over) outcome vectors via an ex post outcome
rule, denoted wˆ : T → ∆(W) where wˆi(t) is the outcome obtained by agent i. We will similarly
define xˆ : T → [0, 1]n as the ex post allocation rule (where [0, 1] ≡ ∆({0, 1})). The ex post
allocation rule xˆ and the probability mass function f on types induce interim outcome and allocation
rules. For agent i with type ti and t ∼ Distt[t | ti] the interim outcome and allocation rules are
wi(ti) = Distt
[
wˆi(t)
∣∣ ti] and xi(ti) = Distt[xˆi(t) ∣∣ ti] ≡ Et[xˆi(t) ∣∣ ti].3 A profile of interim
allocation rules is feasible if it is derived from an ex post allocation rule as described above; the
set of all feasible interim allocation rules is denoted by X. A mechanism is Bayesian incentive
compatible and interim individually rational if equations (IC) and (IR), respectively, hold for all i
and all ti.
Consider again the examples described previously of quasi-linear single-dimensional and unit-
demand preferences. For the single-dimensional example, the multi-agent mechanism design prob-
lem is the standard single-item k-unit auction problem. For the unit-demand example, the multi-
agent mechanism design problem is an attribute auction. In this problem there are k-units available
and each unit can be configured in one of m ways. Importantly, the designer’s feasibility constraint
restricts the number of units sold to be k but places no restrictions on how the units can be con-
figured. E.g., a restaurant has k tables but each diner can order any of the m entrees on the
menu.
A reduction from multi-agent mechanism design to single-agent mechanism design as we have
described above would assume that for any types pace Ti, any probability mass function fi, and
interim allocation rule xi, the optimal outcome rule Outcome(xi) and its performance Rev(xi)
can be found efficiently (see Section 3 for examples). The goal then is to construct an optimal
2Furthremore, in Section 5.3, we review the theory of matroids and extend our basic results environments with
feasibility constraint derived from a matroid set system.
3We use notation Dist[X | E] to denote the distribution of random variable X conditioned on the event E.
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multi-agent auction from these single-agent mechanisms. Our approach to such a reduction is as
follows.
1. Optimize, over all feasible profiles of interim allocation rules x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X, the sum
of performances of the allocation rules
∑
i Rev(xi).
2. Implement the profile of interim outcome rules w given by wi = Outcome(xi) with a feasible
ex post outcome rule wˆ.
Two issues should be noted. First, Step 2 requires an argument that the existence of a feasible
ex post outcome rule for a given profile of interim allocation rules implies the existence of one that
combines the optimal interim outcome rules from Outcome(·). We address this issue in Section 4.
Second, Step 1 requires that we optimize over jointly feasible interim allocation rules, and after
solving for x, its implementation by an ex post allocation rule is needed to guide Step 2. We address
this issue in Section ??. For single-unit (i.e., k = 1) auctions a characterization of the necessary
and sufficient condition for interim feasibility was provided by Kim Border.
Theorem 1 (Border, 1991). In a single-item auction environment, interim allocation rules x are
feasible (i.e., x ∈ X) if and only if the following holds:
∀S1 ⊆ T1, · · · , ∀Sn ⊆ Tn :
n∑
i=1
E
[
xi(ti)
∣∣ ti ∈ Si] ·Pr[ti ∈ Si] ≤ Prt∼f [∃i ∈ [n] : ti ∈ Si]
(MRMB)
3 The Single-agent Problem
Given an allocation rule x(·) as a constraint the single-agent problem is to find the (possibly random-
ized) outcome rule w(·) that allocates no more frequently that x(·), i.e., ∀t ∈ T , Ew(t)
[
Alloc(w(t))
] ≤
x(t), with the maximum expected performance. Recall that the optimal such outcome rule is de-
noted Outcome(x) and its performance (e.g., revenue) is denoted Rev(x). We first observe that
Rev(·) is concave.
Proposition 1. Rev(·) is a concave function in x.
Proof. Consider any two allocation rules x and x′, and any α ∈ [0, 1]. Define x′′ to be αx+(1−α)x′.
We will show that αRev(x) + (1− α) Rev(x′) ≤ Rev(x′′), which proves the claim. To see this, let
w and w′ be Outcome(x) and Outcome(x′), respectively. Define w′′ to be the outcome rule that
runs w with probability α, and w′ with probability 1− α. The incentive compatibility of outcome
rules w and w′ imply the incentive compatibility of w′′, since for any t, t′ ∈ T ,
E
[
u(t, w′′(t))
]
= αE
[
u(t, w(t))
]
+ (1− α)E
[
u(t, w′(t))
]
≥ αE
[
u(t, w(t′))
]
+ (1− α)E
[
u(t, w′(t′))
]
= E
[
u(t, w′′(t′))
]
.
Also, w′′ is feasible as E
[
Alloc(w′′(t))
]
= αE
[
Alloc(w(t))
]
+ (1− α)E[Alloc(w′(t))] ≤ x′′(t) for all
t ∈ T . As a result, Rev(x′′) is at least the revenue of w′′, which is in turn equal to αRev(x) + (1−
α) Rev(x′).
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We now give two examples for which the single-agent problem is computationally tractable.
Both of these example are multi-dimensional. The first example is that of a standard multi-item
unit-demand preferences. The second example that of a single-item with a private budget. For
both of these problems the single-agent problem can be expressed as a linear program with size
polynomial in the cardinality of the agent’s type space.
3.1 Quasi-linear Unit-demand Preferences
There are m items available. There is a finite type space T ⊂ Rm+ ; the outcome space W is the
direct product between an assignment to the agent of one of the m items, or none, and a required
payment. ∆(W ) is the cross product of a probability distribution over which item the agent receives
and a probability distribution over payments. Without loss of generality for a quasi-linear agent
such a randomized outcome can be represented as w = (w1, . . . , wm, wp) where for j ∈ [m], wj is
the probability that the agent receives item j and wp is the agent’s required payment.
A single-agent mechanism assigns to each type an outcome as described above. An outcome
rule specifies an outcome for any type t of the agent as w(t) = (w1(t), . . . , wm(t), wp(t)). This gives
m+ 1 non-negative real valued variables for each of |T | types. The following linear program, which
is a simple adaptation of one from Briest et al. (2010) to include the feasibility constraint given by
x, solves for the optimal single-agent mechanism:
max :
∑
t∈T f(t)wp(t)
s.t.
∑
j
wj(t) ≤ x(t) ∀t ∈ T∑
j
tjwj(t)− wp(t) ≥
∑
j
tjwj(t
′)− wp(t′) ∀t, t′ ∈ T∑
j
tjwj(t)− wp(t) ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T.
The optimal outcome rule from this program is w∗ = Outcome(x) and its performance is Rev(x) =
Et∼f
[
w∗p(t)
]
.
Proposition 2. The single-agent m-item unit-demand problem can be solved in polynomial time
in m and |T |.
3.2 Private budget preferences.
There is a single item available. The agent has a private value for this item and a private budget,
i.e., T ⊂ R2+; we will denote by tv and tb this value and budget respectively. The outcome space is
W = {0, 1} × R where for w ∈ W the first coordinate wx denotes whether the agent receives the
item or not and the second coordinate wp denotes her payment. The agent’s utility is
u(t, w) =
tvwx − wp if wp ≤ tb, and−∞ otherwise.
Claim 1 below implies that when optimizing over distributions on outcomes we can restrict attention
to [0, 1] × [0, 1] × R+ ⊂ ∆(W ) where the first coordinate denotes the probability that the agent
receives the item, the second coordinate denotes the probability that the agent makes a non-zero
payment, and the third coordinate denotes the non-zero payment made.
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Claim 1. Any incentive compatible and individually rational outcome rule can be converted into
an outcome rule above with the same expected revenue.
As a sketch of the argument to show this claim, note that if an agent with type t receives
randomized outcome w she is just as happy to receive the item with the same probability and
pay her budget with probability equal to her previous expected payment divided by her budget.
Such a payment is budget feasible and has the same expectation as before. Furthermore, this
transformation only increases the maximum payment that any agent makes which means that
the relevant incentive compatibility constraints are only fewer. Importantly, the only incentive
constraints necessary are ones that prevent types with higher budgets from reporting types with
lower budgets.
A single-agent mechanism assigns to each type an outcome as described above. We denote the
distribution over outcomes for t by w(t) = (wx(t), wρ(t), tb) where only the first two coordinates
are free variables. This gives two non-negative real valued variables for each of |T | types. The
following linear program solves for the optimal single-agent mechanism:
max :
∑
t∈T f(t)tbwρ(t)
s.t. wx(t) ≤ x(t) ∀t ∈ T
tvwx(t)− tbwρ(t) ≥ tvwx(t′)− t′bwρ(t′) ∀t, t′ ∈ T with t′b ≤ tb
tvwx(t)− tbwρ(t) ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T
wρ(t) ≤ 1 ∀t ∈ T.
The optimal outcome rule from this program is w∗ = Outcome(x) and its performance is Rev(x) =
Et∼f
[
tbw
∗
ρ(t)
]
.
Proposition 3. The single-agent private budget problem can be solved in polynomial time in |T |.
4 Multi- to Single-agent Reductions
An ex post allocation rule xˆ takes as its input a profile of types t = (t1, . . . , tn) of the agents, and
indicates by xˆi(t) a set of at most k winners. Agent i’s type ti ∈ Ti is drawn independently at
random from distribution fi ∈ ∆(Ti). An ex post allocation rule implements an interim allocation
rule xi : Ti → [0, 1], for agent i, if the probability of winning for agent i conditioned on her type
ti ∈ Ti is exactly xi(ti), where the probability is taken over the random types other agents and
the random choices of the allocation rule. A profile of interim allocation rules x = (x1, . . . , xn) is
feasible if and only if it can be implemented by some ex post allocation rule. X denotes the space
of all feasible profiles of interim allocation rules.
The optimal performance (e.g., revenue) of the single-agent problem with allocation constraint
given by x is denoted Rev(x). The outcome rule corresponding to this optimal revenue is Outcome(x).
Given any feasible interim allocation rule x ∈ X we would like to construct an auction with revenue∑
i Rev(xi). We need to be careful because Outcome(xi), by definition, is only required to have
allocation rules upper bounded by xi (see (SP) in Section 2), while the ex post allocation rule xˆi im-
plements xi exactly, and hence we may need to scale down xˆi accordingly. This is defined formally
as follows.
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Definition 1. An optimal auction wˆ∗ for feasible interim allocation rule x (with corresponding ex
post allocation rule xˆ) is defined as follows on t. For agent i:
1. Let w∗i = Outcome(xi) be the optimal outcome rule for allocation constraint xi.
2. Let x∗i = E
[
Alloc(w∗i )
]
be the allocation rule corresponding to outcome rule w∗i .
3. If xˆi(t) = 1, output
wˆ∗i (t) ∼
Dist
[
w∗i (ti)
∣∣ Alloc(w∗i (ti)) = 1] w.p. x∗i (ti)/xi(ti), and
Dist
[
w∗i (ti)
∣∣ Alloc(w∗i (ti)) = 0] otherwise.
4. Otherwise (when xˆi(t) = 0), output wˆ
∗
i (t) ∼ Dist
[
w∗i (ti)
∣∣ Alloc(w∗i (ti)) = 0] .
Proposition 4. For any feasible interim allocation rule x ∈ X, the optimal auction for this rule
has expected revenue
∑
i Rev(xi).
Proof. The ex post outcome rule wˆ∗ of the auction, by construction, induces interim outcome rule
w∗ for which the revenue is as desired.
The optimal multi-agent auction is the solution to optimizing the cumulative revenue of indi-
vidual single-agent problems subject to the joint interim feasibility constraint given by x ∈ X.
Proposition 5. The optimal revenue is given by the convex program
max
x∈X
:
∑
i
Revi(xi). (CP)
Proof. This is a convex program as Rev(·) is concave and X is convex (convex combinations of
feasible interim allocation rules are feasible). By Proposition 4 this revenue is attainable; therefore,
it is optimal.
5 Optimization and Implementation of Interim Allocation Rules
In this section we address the computational issues pertaining to (i) solving optimization problems
over the space of feasible interim allocation rules, and (ii) ex post implementation of such a feasible
interim allocation rule. We present computationally tractable methods for both problems.
Normalized interim allocation rules. It will be useful to “flatten” the interim allocation rule
x for which xi(ti) denotes the probability that i with type ti is served (randomizing over the
mechanism and the draws of other agent types); we do so as follows. Without loss of generality,
we assume that the type spaces of different agents are disjoint.4 Denoting the set of all types by
TN =
⋃
i Ti, the interim allocation rule can be flattened as a vector in [0, 1]
TN .
Definition 2. The normalized interim allocation rule x ∈ [0, 1]TN corresponding to interim alloca-
tion rule x under distribution f is defined as
x(ti) = xi(ti)fi(ti) ∀ti ∈ TN
4This can be achieved by labeling all types of each agent with the name of that agent, i.e., for each i ∈ [n] we can
replace Ti with T
′
i = {(i, t)|t ∈ Ti} so that T ′1, · · · , T ′n are disjoint.
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For the rest of this section, we refer to interim allocation rules via x instead of x. Note that
there is a one-to-one correspondence between x and x as specified by the above linear equation;
so any linear of convex optimization problem involving x can be written in terms of x without
affecting its linearity or convexity. As X denotes the space of feasible interim allocation rules x, we
will use X to denote the space of feasible normalized interim allocation rules.
In the remainder of this section we characterize interim feasibility and show that normalized
interim allocation rules can be optimized over and implemented in polynomial time.
5.1 Single Unit Feasibility Constraints
In this section, we consider environments where at most one agent can be allocated to. For such en-
vironments, we characterize interim feasibility as implementability via a particular, simple stochas-
tic sequential allocation mechanism. Importantly, the parameters of this mechanism are easy to
optimize efficiently.
A stochastic sequential allocation mechanism is parameterized by a stochastic transition table.
Such a table specifies the probability by which an agent with a given type can steal a token from
a preceding agent with a given type. For simplicity in describing the process we will assume the
token starts under the possession of a “dummy agent” indexed by 0; the agents are then considered
in the arbitrary order from 1 to n; and the agent with the token at the end of the process is the
one that is allocated (or none are allocated if the dummy agent retains the token).
Definition 3 (stochastic sequential allocation mechanism). Parameterized by a stochastic transi-
tion table pi, the stochastic sequential allocation mechanism (SSA) computes the allocations for a
type profile t ∈ T as follows:
1. Give the token to the dummy agent 0 with dummy type t0.
2. For each agent i: (in order of 1 to n)
If agent i′ has the token, transfer the token to agent i with probability pi(ti′ , ti).
3. Allocate to the agent who has the token (or none if the dummy agent has it).
First, we present a dynamic program, in the form of a collection of linear equations, for calcu-
lating the interim allocation rule implemented by SSA for a given pi. Let y(ti′ , i) denote the ex-ante
probability of the event that agent i′ has type ti′ and is holding the token at the end of iteration i.
Let z(ti′ , ti) denote the ex-ante probability in iteration i of SSA that agent i has type ti and takes
the token from agent i′ who has type ti′ .
The following additional notation will be useful in this section. For any subset of agents N ′ ⊆
N = {1, . . . , n}, we define TN ′ =
⋃
i∈N ′ Ti (Recall that without loss of generality agent type spaces
are assumed to be disjoint.). The shorthand notation ti ∈ S for S ⊆ TN will be used to quantify
over all types in S and their corresponding agents (i.e., ∀ti ∈ S is equivalent to ∀i ∈ N, ∀ti ∈ S∩Ti).
The normalized interim allocation rule x resulting from the SSA is exactly given by the dynamic
program specified by the following linear equations.
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y(t0, 0) = 1, (S.1)
y(ti, i) =
∑
ti′∈T{0,...,i−1}
z(ti′ , ti), ∀ti ∈ T{1,...,n} (S.2)
y(ti′ , i) = y(ti′ , i− 1)−
∑
ti∈Ti
z(ti′ , ti), ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} ,∀ti′ ∈ T{0,...,i−1} (S.3)
z(ti′ , ti) = y(ti′ , i− 1)pi(ti′ , ti)fi(ti), ∀ti ∈ T{1,...,n}, ∀ti′ ∈ T{0,...,i−1} (pi)
x(ti) = y(ti, n), ∀ti ∈ T{1,...,n}
Note that pi is the only adjustable parameter in the SSA algorithm, so by relaxing the equation
(pi) and replacing it with the following inequality we can specify all possible dynamics of the SSA
algorithm.
0 ≤ z(ti′ , ti) ≤ y(ti′ , i− 1)fi(ti), ∀ti ∈ T{1,...,n}, ∀ti′ ∈ T{0,...,i−1} (S.4)
Let S denote the convex polytope captured by the 4 sets of linear constraints (S.1) through
(S.4) above, i.e., (y, z) ∈ S iff y and z satisfy the aforementioned constraints. Note that every
(y, z) ∈ S corresponds to some stochastic transition table pi by solving equation (pi) for pi(ti, ti′).
We show that S captures all feasible normalized interim allocation rules, i.e., the projection of S
on x(·) = y(·, n) is exactly X, as formally stated by the following theorem.
Theorem 2. A normalized interim allocation rule x is feasible if and only if it can be implemented
by the SSA algorithm for some choice of stochastic transition table pi. In other words, x ∈ X iff
there exists (y, z) ∈ S such that x(ti) = y(ti, n) for all ti ∈ TN .
Corollary 1. Given a blackbox for each agent i that solves for the optimal expected revenue Revi(xi)
for any feasible interim allocation rule x, the optimal interim allocation rule can be computed by
the following convex program which is of quadratic size in the total number of types.
maximize
n∑
i=1
Revi(xi)
subject to y(ti, n) = x(ti) = xi(ti)fi(ti), ∀ti ∈ TN
(y, z) ∈ S.
Furthermore, given an optimal assignment for this program, the computed interim allocation rule
can be implemented by SSA using the the stochastic transition table defined by:5
pi(ti′ , ti) =
z(ti′ , ti)
y(ti′ , i− 1)fi(ti) , ∀ti ∈ T{1,...,n},∀ti
′ ∈ T{0,...,i−1}.
Next, we present a few definitions and lemmas that are used in the proof of Theorem 2. Two
transition tables pi and pi′ are considered equivalent if their induced normalized interim allocation
rules for SSA are equal. Type ti is called degenerate for pi if in the execution of SSA the token
5If the denominator is zero, i.e., y(ti, i
′ − 1) = 0, we can set pi(ti, ti′) to an arbitrary value in [0, 1].
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is sometimes passed to type ti but it is always taken away from ti later, i.e., if y(ti, i) > 0 but
y(ti, n) = 0. The stochastic transition table pi is degenerate if there is a degenerate type. For pi,
type ti is augmentable if there exists a pi
′ (with a corresponding y′) which is equivalent to pi for all
types expect ti and has y(ti, n) > y
′(ti, n).6
Lemma 1. For any stochastic transition table pi there exists an equivalent pi′ that is non-degenerate.
Lemma 2. For any non-degenerate stochastic transition table pi, any non-augmentable type ti
always wins against any augmentable type ti′. I.e.,
• if i′ < i and ti′ has non-zero probability of holding the token then pi(ti′ , ti) = 1, i.e., ti always
takes the token away from ti′, and
• if i < i′ and ti has non-zero probability of holding the token then pi(ti, ti′) = 0, i.e., ti′ never
takes the token away from ti.
It is possible to view the token passing in stochastic sequential allocation as a network flow. From
this perspective, the augmentable and non-augmentable types form a minimum-cut and Lemma 2
states that the token must eventually flow from the augmentable to non-augmentable types. We
defer the proof of this lemma to Appendix A where the main difficulty in its proof is that the edges
in the relevant flow problem have dynamic(non-constant) capacities.
Proof of Theorem 2. Any normalized interim allocation rule that can be implemented by the SSA
algorithm is obviously feasible, so we only need to prove the opposite direction. The proof is by
contradiction, i.e., given a normalized interim allocation rule x we show that if there is no (y, z) ∈ S
such that x(·) = y(·, n), then x must be infeasible. Consider the following linear program for a
given x (i.e., x is constant).
maximize
∑
ti∈T{1,...,n}
y(ti, n)
subject to y(ti, n) ≤ x(ti), ∀ti ∈ T{1,...,n}
(y, z) ∈ S.
Let (y, z) be an optimal assignment of this LP. If the first set of inequalities are all tight (i.e.,
x(·) = y(·, n)) then x can be implemented by the SSA, so by contradiction there must exists a type
τ∗ ∈ TN for which the inequality is not tight. Note that τ∗ cannot be augmentable — otherwise,
by the definition of augmentability, the objective of the LP could be improved. Partition TN
to augmentable types T+N and non-augmentable types T
−
N . Note that T
−
N is non-empty because
τ∗ ∈ T−N . Without loss of generality, by Lemma 1 we may assume that (y, z) is non-degenerate.7
An agent wins if she holds the token at the end of the SSA algorithm. The ex ante probability
that some agent with non-augmentable type wins is
∑
ti∈T−N y(ti, n). On the other hand, Lemma 2
implies that the first (in the order agents are considered by SSA) agent with non-augmentable
type will take the token from her predecessors and, while she may lose the token to another
non-augmentable type, the token will not be relinquished to any augmentable type. Therefore,
6We define t0 to be augmentable unless the dummy agent never retains the token in which case all agents are
non-augmentable (and for technical reasons we declare the dummy agent to be non-augmentable as well).
7By Lemma 1, there exits an non-degenerate assignment with the same objective value.
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the probability that an agent with a non-augmentable type is the winner is exactly equal to the
probability that at least one such agent exists, therefore
Prt∼f
[
∃i : ti ∈ T−N
]
=
∑
ti∈T−N
y(ti, n) <
∑
ti∈T−N
x(ti).
The second inequality follows from the assumption above that τ∗ satisfies y(τ∗, n) < x(τ∗). We
conclude that x requires an agent with non-augmentable type to win more frequently than such an
agent exists, which is a contradiction to interim feasibility of x.
The contradiction that we derived in the proof of Theorem 2 yields a necessary and sufficient
condition, as formally stated in the following corollary, for feasibility of any given normalized interim
allocation rule.
Corollary 2. A normalized interim allocation rule x is feasible if and only if∑
τ∈S
x(τ) ≤ Prt∼f [∃i : ti ∈ S] , ∀S ⊆ TN (MRMB)
The necessity of condition (MRMB) is trivial and its sufficiency was previously proved by Border
(1991). This condition implies that the space of all feasible normalized interim allocation rules, X,
can be specified by 2D linear constraints on D-dimensional vectors x. An important consequence
of Theorem 2 is that X can equivalently be formulated by only O(D2) variables and O(D2) linear
constraints as a projection of S, therefore any optimization problem over X can equivalently be
solved over S.
5.2 k-Unit Feasibility Constraints
In this section, we consider environments where at most k agents can be simultaneously allocated
to. First, we generalize Border’s characterization of interim feasibility to environments with k-unit
feasibility constraint. Our generalization implies that the space of feasible normalized interim al-
location rules is a polymatroid. Second, we observe that optimization problems can be efficiently
solved over polymatroids; this allows us to optimize over feasible interim allocation rules. Third, we
show that the normalized interim allocation rules corresponding to the vertices of this polymatroid
are implemented by simple deterministic ordered-subset-based allocation mechanisms. Further-
more, for any point in this polymatroid, the corresponding normalized interim allocation rule can
be implemented by, (i) expressing it as a convex combination of the vertices of the polymatroid, (ii)
sampling from this convex combination, and (iii) using the ordered subset mechanism corresponding
to the sampled vertex. We present an efficient randomized rounding routine for rounding a point
in a polymatroid to a vertex which combines the steps (i) and (ii). These approaches together yield
efficient algorithms for optimizing and implementing interim allocation rules.
Polymatroid Preliminaries. Consider an arbitrary set function F : 2U → R+ defined over an
arbitrary finite set U ; let PF denote the polytope associate with F defined as
PF =
{
y ∈ RU+
∣∣∣∀S ⊆ U : y(S) ≤ F(S)}
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where y(S) denotes
∑
s∈S y(s). The convex polytope PF is called a polymatroid if F is a submodular
function. Even though a polymatroid is defined by an exponential number of linear inequalities,
the separation problem for any given y ∈ RU+ can be solved in polynomial time as follows: find
S∗ = arg minS F(S)− y(S); if y is infeasible, the inequality y(S∗) ≤ F(S∗) must be violated, and
that yields a separating hyperplane for y. Note that F(S) − y(S) is itself submodular in S, so it
can be minimized in strong polynomial time. Consequently, optimization problems can be solved
over polymatroids in polynomial time. Next, we describe a characterization of the vertices of a
polymatroid. This characterization plays an important role in our proofs and also in our ex post
implementation of interim allocation rules.
Definition 4 (ordered subset). For an arbitrary finite set U , an ordered subset pi ⊂ U is given
by an ordering on elements pi = (pi1, . . . , pi|pi|) where shorthand notation pir ∈ pi denotes the rth
element in pi.
Proposition 6. Let F : 2U → R+ be an arbitrary non-decreasing submodular function with F(∅) =
0 and let PF be the associated polymatroid with the set of vertices Vertex(PF ). Every ordered
subset pi of U (see Definition 4) corresponds to a vertex of PF , denoted by Vertex(PF , pi), which
is computed as follows.
∀s ∈ U : y(s) =
F({pi1, . . . , pir})−F({pi1, . . . , pir−1}) if s = pir ∈ pi0 if s 6∈ pi
Furthermore, for every y ∈ Vertex(PF ) there exist a corresponding pi.
It is easy to see that for any y ∈ Vertex(PF ), an associated pi can be found efficiently by a
greedy algorithm (see Schrijver (2003) for a comprehensive treatment of polymatroids).
Ordered subset allocation mechanisms. The following class of allocation mechanisms are of
particular importance both in our characterization of interim feasibility and in ex post implemen-
tation of interim allocation rules.
Definition 5 (ordered subset allocation mechanism). Parameterized by a ordered subset pi of TN
(see Definition 4), the ordered subset mechanism, on profile of types t ∈ T, orders the agents based
on their types according to pi, and allocates to the agents greedily (e.g., with k units available the
k first ordered agents received a unit). If an agent i with type ti 6∈ pi is never served.8
Characterization of interim feasibility. Border’s characterization of interim feasibility for
k = 1 unit auctions states that the probability of serving a type in a subspace of type space
is no more than the probability that a type in that subspace shows up. This upper bound is
equivalent to the expected minimum of one and the number of types from the subspace that
show up; furthermore, this equivalent phrasing of the upper bound extends to characterize interim
feasibility in k-unit auctions.
8The virtual valuation maximizing mechanisms from the classical literature on revenue maximizing auctions are
ordered subset mechanisms, see, e.g., Myerson (1981), an observation made previousl by E. (2007). The difference
between these ordered subset mechanisms and the classic virtual valuation maximization mechanisms is that our
ordered subset will come from solving an optimization on the whole auction problem where as the Myerson’s virtual
values come directly from single-agent optimizations.
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Consider expressing an ex post allocation for type profile t by xˆt ∈ {0, 1}TN as follows. For
all t′i ∈ TN , xˆt(t′i) = 1 if player i is served and ti = t′i and 0 otherwise. This definition of ex
post allocations is convenient as the normalized interim allocation rule is calculated by taking its
expecation, i.e., x(t′i) = Et
[
xˆt(t′i)
]
. Ex post feasibility requires that,
xˆt(S) ≤ min(|t ∩ S|, k), ∀t ∈ T,∀S ⊆ TN (1)
In other words: for any profile of types t, the number of types in S that are served by xˆt must be
at most the number of types in S that showed up in t and the upper bound k. Taking expectations
of both sides of this equation with respect to t motivates the following definition and theorem.
Definition 6. The expected rank function for distribution f and subspace S ⊂ TN is
gk(S) = Et∼f
[
min
(|t ∩ S|, k)] (gk)
where t ∩ S denotes {t1, . . . , tn} ∩ S.
Theorem 3. For supply constraint k and distribution f , the space of all feasible normalized interim
allocation rules, X, is the polymatroid associated with gk, i.e., X = Pgk , i.e., for all x ∈ X,
x(S) ≤ Et
[
min(|t ∩ S|, k)] = gk(S), ∀S ⊆ TN (2)
The proof of this theorem will be deferred to the next section where we will derive a more general
theorem. A key step in the proof will be relating the statement of the theorem to the polymatroid
theory described already. To show that the constraint of the theorem is a polymatroid, we observe
that the expected rank function is submoduler.
Lemma 3. The expected rank function gk is submodular.
Proof. Observe that for any fixed t, min(t ∩ S, k) is obviously a submodular function in S, and
therefore gk is a convex combination
9 of submodular functions, so gk is submodular.
We now relate vertices of the polymatroid to ordered subset allocation mechanisms.
Theorem 4. For supply constraint k, if x ∈ X is the vertex Vertex(Pgk , pi) of the polymatroid
Pgk the unique ex post implementation is the ordered subset mechanism induced by pi (Definition 5).
Proof. Let x = Vertex(Pgk , pi) be an arbitrary vertex of Pgk with a corresponding ordered subset
pi; by Proposition 6, such a pi exists for every vertex of a polymatroid. For every integer r ≤ |pi|,
define Sr = {pi1, . . . , pir} as the r-element prefix of the ordering. By Proposition 6, inequality (2)
must be tight for every Sr which implies that inequality (1) must also be tight for every Sr and
every t ∈ T. Observe that inequality (1) being tight for a subset S of types implies that any ex
post allocation mechanism implementing x must allocate as much as possible to types in S. By
definition, an ordered subset mechanism allocates to as many types as possible (up to k) from each
Sr; this is the unique outcome given that inequality (1) is tight for every Sr.
9Note that taking the expectation is the same as taking a convex combination.
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Optimization over feasible interim allocation rules. The characterization of interim feasi-
bility as a polymatroid constraint immediately enables efficient solving of optimization problems
over the feasible interim allocation rules as long as we can compute gk efficiently (see Schrijver
(2003) for optimization over polymatroids). The following lemma states that gk can be computed
efficiently.
Lemma 4. For independent agent (i.e., if f is a product distribution), gk(S) can be exactly computed
in time O((n+ |S|) · k) for any S ∈ TN using dynamic programming.
Ex post implementation of feasible interim allocation rules. We now address the task of
finding an ex post implementation corresponding to any x ∈ X. By Theorem 7, if x is a vertex
of X, it can be easily implemented by an ordered subset allocation mechanism (Definition 5). As
any point in the polymatroid (or any convex polytope) can be specified as a convex combination
of its vertices, to implement the corresponding interim allocation rule it is enough to show that
this convex combination can be efficiently sampled from. An ex post implementation can then
be obtained by sampling a vertex and using the ordered subset mechanism corresponding to that
vertex. Instead of explicitly computing this convex combination, we present a general randomized
rounding routine RandRound(·) which takes a point in a polymatroid and returns a vertex of the
polymatroid such that the expected value of every coordinate of the returned vertex is the same as
the original point. This approach is formally described next.
Definition 7 (randomized ordered subset allocation mechanism). Parameterized by a normalized
interim allocation rule x ∈ X, a randomized ordered subset allocation mechanism (RRA) computes
the allocation for a profile of types t ∈ T as follows.
1. Let (x∗, pi∗)← RandRound(x).
2. Run the ordered subset mechanism (Definition 5) with ordered subset pi∗.
Theorem 5. Any normalized interim allocation rule x ∈ X can be implemented by the randomized
ordered subset allocation mechanism (Definition 7) as a distribution over deterministic ordered
subset allocation mechanisms.
Proof. The proof follows from linearity of expectation.
Randomized rounding for polymatroids. We describe RandRound(·) for general polyma-
troids. First, we present a few definitions and give an overview of the rounding operator. Consider
an arbitrary finite set U and a polymatroid PF associated with a non-decreasing submodular func-
tion F : 2U → R+ with F(∅) = 0. A set S ⊆ U is called tight with respect to a y ∈ PF , if and
only if y(S) = F(S). A set S = {S0, . . . , Sm} of subsets of U is called a nested family of tight sets
with respect to y ∈ PF , if and only the elements of S can be or ordered and indexed such that
∅ = S0 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Sm ⊆ U , and such that Sr is tight with respect to y (for every r ∈ [m]).
RandRound(y) takes an arbitrary y ∈ PF and iteratively makes small changes to it until a
vertex is reached. At each iteration `, it computes y` ∈ PF , and a nested family of tight sets S`
(with respect to y`) such that
• E[y`|y`−1] = y`−1, and
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• y` is closer to a vertex (compared to y`−1) in the sense that either the number of non-zero
coordinates has decreased by one or the number of tight sets has increased by one.
Observe that the above process must stop after at most 2|U | iterations10. At each iteration ` of
the rounding process, a vector yˆ ∈ RU and δ, δ′ ∈ R+ are computed such that both y`−1 + δ · yˆ
and y`−1 − δ′ · yˆ are still in PF , but closer to a vertex. The algorithm then chooses a random
δ′′ ∈ {δ,−δ′} such that E[δ′′] = 0, and sets y` ← y`−1 + δ′′ · yˆ.
Definition 8 (RandRound(y)). This operator takes as its input a point y ∈ PF and returns as
its output a pair (y∗, pi∗), where y∗ is a random vertex of PF and pi∗ is its associated ordered subset
(see Proposition 6), and such that E[y∗] = y.
The algorithm modifies y iteratively until a vertex is reached. It also maintains a nested family
of tight sets S with respect to y. As we modify S, we always maintain an ordered labeling of its
elements, i.e., if S = {S0, . . . , Sm}, we assume that ∅ = S0 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Sm ⊆ U ; in particular, the
indices are updated whenever a new tight set is added. For each s ∈ U , define 1s ∈ [0, 1]U as a
vector whose value is 1 at coordinate s and 0 everywhere else.
1. Initialize S← {∅}.
2. Repeat each of the following steps until no longer applicable:
• If there exist distinct s, s′ ∈ Sr \ Sr−1 for some r ∈ [m]:
(a) Set yˆ ← 1s − 1s′ , and compute δ, δ′ ∈ R+ such that y + δ · yˆ has a new tight set S
and y − δ′ · yˆ has a new tight set S′, i.e,
– set S ← arg minSr−1+s⊆S⊆Sr−s′ F(S)− y(S), and δ ← F(S)− y(S);
– set S′ ← arg minSr−1+s′⊆S′⊆Sr−sF(S′)− y(S′), and δ′ ← F(S′)− y(S′).
(b)
with prob. δδ+δ′ : set y ← y + δ · yˆ, and add S to S.with prob. δ′δ+δ′ : set y ← y − δ′ · yˆ, and add S′ to S.
• If there exists s ∈ U \ Sm for which y(s) > 0:
(a) Set yˆ ← 1s, and compute δ, δ′ ∈ R+ such that y + δ · yˆ has a new tight set S and
y − δ′ · yˆ has a zero at coordinate s, i.e,
– set S ← arg minS⊇Sm+sF(S)− y(S), and δ ← F(S)− y(S);
– set δ′ ← y(s).
(b)
with prob. δδ+δ′ : set y ← y + δ · yˆ, and add S to S.with prob. δ′δ+δ′ : set y ← y − δ′ · yˆ
3. Set y∗ ← y and define the ordered subset pi∗ : Sm → [m] according to S, i.e., for each r ∈ [m]
and s ∈ Sr \ Sr−1, define pi∗(s) = r.
4. Return (y∗, pi∗).
Theorem 6. For any non-decreasing submodular function F : 2U → R+ and any y ∈ PF , the
operator RandRound(y) returns a random (y∗, pi∗) such that y∗ ∈ Vertex(PF ), and pi∗ is the
ordered subset corresponding to y∗ (see Proposition 6), and such that E[y∗] = y. Furthermore, the
algorithm runs in strong polynomial time. In particular, it runs for O(|U |) iterations where each
iteration involves solving two submodular minimizations.
10In fact we will show that it stops after at most |U | iterations.
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5.3 Matroid Feasibility Constraints
In this section, we consider environments where the feasibility constraints are encoded by a matroid
M = (TN , I). For every type profile t ∈ T, a subset S ⊆ {t1, . . . , tn} can be simultaneously
allocated to if and only if S ∈ I. We show that the results of subsection 5.2 can be easily generalized
to environments with matroid feasibility constraints.
Matroid Preliminaries. A matroid M = (U , I) consists of a ground set U and a family of
independent sets I ⊆ 2U with the following two properties.
• For every I, I ′, if I ′ ⊂ I ∈ I, then I ′ ∈ I.
• For every I, I ′ ∈ I, if |I ′| < |I|, there exists s ∈ I \ I ′ such that I ′ ∪ {s} ∈ I.
For every matroid M, the rank function rM : 2U → N ∪ {0} is defined as follows: for each
S ⊆ U , rM(S) is the size of the maximum independent subset of S. A matroid can be uniquely
characterized by its rank function, i.e., a set I ⊆ U is an independent set if and only if rM(I) = |I|.
A matroid rank function has the following two properties:
• rM(·) is a non-negative non-decreasing integral submodular function.
• rM(S) ≤ |S|, for all S ⊆ U .
Furthermore, every function with the above properties defines a matroid.
Any set S ⊆ U can be equivalently represented by its incidence vector χS ∈ {0, 1}U which has
a 1 at every coordinate s ∈ S and 0 everywhere else.
Proposition 7. Consider an arbitrary finite matroid M = (U , I) with rank function rM(·). Let
PrM denote the polymatroid associated with rM(·) (see subsection 5.2); the vertices of PrM are
exactly the incidence vectors of the independent sets of M.
See Schrijver (2003) for a comprehensive treatment of matroids.
Characterization of interim feasibility. We now generalize the characterization of interim
feasibility as the polymatroid given by the expected rank of the matroid. From this generalization
the computational results of the preceeding section can be extended from k-unit environments to
matroids.
Let b denote the random bits used by an ex post allocation rule, and let xˆt,b ∈ {0, 1}TN denote
the ex post allocation rule (i.e., the incidence vector of the subset of types that get allocated to)
for type profile t ∈ T and random bits b. It is easy to see that xˆt,b is a feasible ex post allocation
if and only if it satisfies the following class of inequalities.
xˆt,b(S) ≤ rM(t ∩ S), ∀t ∈ T,∀S ⊆ TN (3)
The above inequality states that the subset of types that get allocated to must be an independent set
of the restriction of matroidM to {t1, . . . , tn}. The expectation of the left-hand-side is exactly the
normalized interim allocation rule, i.e., for any t′i ∈ TN , x(t′i) = Et,b
[
xˆt,b(t′i)
]
. Taking expectations
of both sides of (3) then motivates the following definition and theorem that characterize interim
feasibility.
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Definition 9. The expected rank for distribudion f , subspace S ⊂ TN , and matroid M with rank
function rM is
gM(S) = Et∼f
[
rM(t ∩ S)
]
(gM)
where t ∩ S denotes {t1, . . . , tn} ∩ S.
Theorem 7. For matroid M and distribution f , the space of all feasible normalized interim allo-
cation rules, X, is the polymatroid associated with gk, i.e., X = PgM, i.e., for all x ∈ X,
x(S) ≤ Et
[
rM(t ∩ S)
]
= gM(S), ∀S ⊆ TN (4)
Theorem 8. For matroid M, if x ∈ X is the vertex Vertex(PgM , pi) of the polymatroid PgM the
unique ex post implementation is the ordered subset mechanism induced by pi (Definition 5).
To prove the above theorems, we use the following decomposition lemma which applies to
general polymatroids.
Lemma 5 (Polymatroidal Decomposition). Let U be an arbitrary finite set, F1, . . . ,Fm : 2U → R+
be arbitrary non-decreasing submodular functions, and F∗ = ∑mj=1 λjF j be an arbitrary convex
combination of them. For every y∗ the following holds: y∗ ∈ PF∗ if and only if it can be decomposed
as y∗ =
∑m
j=1 λ
jyj such that yj ∈ PFj (for each j ∈ [m]). Furthermore, if y∗ is a vertex of PF∗,
this decomposition is unique. More precisely, if y∗ = Vertex(PF∗ , pi) for some ordered subset pi,
then yj = Vertex(PFj , pi) (for each j ∈ [m]).
Proof. First, observe that the only-if part is obviously true, i.e., if yj ∈ PFj (for each j ∈ [m]), we
can write
yj(S) ≤ F j(S) ∀S ⊆ U , (5)
multiplying both sides by λj and summing over all j ∈ [m] we obtain
y∗(S) =
m∑
i=1
λjyj(S) ≤
m∑
j=1
λjF j(S) = F∗(S) ∀S ⊆ U , (6)
which implies that y∗ ∈ PF∗ .
Next, we prove that for every y∗ ∈ PF∗ such a decomposition exists. Note that a polymatroid
is a convex polytope, so any y∗ ∈ PF∗ can be written as a convex combination of vertices as
y∗ =
∑
` α
`y∗`, where each y∗` is a vertex of PF∗ ; consequently, if we prove the claim for the vertices
of PF∗ , i.e., that y∗` =
∑m
j=1 λ
jy`,j for some y`,j ∈ PFj , then a decomposition of y∗ =
∑m
j=1 λ
jyj
can be obtained by setting yj =
∑
` α
`y`,j .
Next, we prove the second part of the theorem which also implies that a decomposition exists for
every vertex of PF∗ . Let y∗ = Vertex(PF∗ , pi) be an arbitrary vertex of PF∗ with a corresponding
ordered subset pi; by Proposition 6, such a pi exists for every vertex of a polymatroid. For every
integer r ≤ |pi|, define Sr = {pi1, . . . , pir} as the r-element prefix of the ordering. By Proposition 6,
inequality (6) is tight for every Sr, which implies that inequality (5) must also be tight for each Sr
and for every j ∈ [m]. Consequently, for each r ∈ [|pi|], and each j ∈ [m], by taking the difference
of the inequality (6) for Sr and Sr−1, given that they are tight, we obtain
yj(s) = F j(Sr)−F j(Sr−1)
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Furthermore, for each s 6∈ pi, y∗(s) = 0 which implies that yj(s) = 0 for every j ∈ [m]. Observe that
we have obtained a unique yj for each j ∈ [m] which is exactly the vertex of PFj corresponding to
pi as described in Proposition 6. It is easy to verify that indeed y∗ =
∑m
j=1 λ
jyj .
Proof of Theorem 7. The inequality in equation (3) states that the subset of types that get allocated
to must be an independent set of the restriction of matroid M to {t1, . . . , tn}. Define rtM(S) =
rM(t∩S) (for all (S ⊆ TN ). Notice that rtM is a submodular function. The above inequality implies
that xˆt,b ∈ PrtM . Define xˆ
t = Eb[xˆ
t,b]. Observe that x = Et[xˆ
t], so x is a feasible normalized interim
allocation rule if and only if it can be decomposed as x =
∑
t∈T f(t)xˆ
t where xˆt ∈ PrtM for every
t ∈ T; by Lemma 5, this is equivalent to x ∈ PgM where gM(S) =
∑
t∈T f(t)r
t
M(S) = Et[r
t
M(S)]
(for all S ⊆ TN ), as defined in Definition 9. That completes the proof of the first part of the
theorem.
Proof of Theorem 8. Suppose x = Vertex(PgM , pi) for some ordered subset pi. By Lemma 5, the
decomposition of x is unique and is given by xˆt = Vertex(PrtM
, pi). Notice that this is the same
allocation obtained by the deterministic rank-based allocation mechanism which ranks according
to pi (see Definition 5).
Optimization over feasible interim allocation rules. As in subsection 5.2, the characteriza-
tion of interim feasibility as a polymatroid constraint immediately enables efficient solving of opti-
mization problems over the feasible normalized interim allocation rules as long as we can compute
gM efficiently (see Schrijver (2003) for optimization over polymatroids). Depending on the specific
matroid, it might be possible to exactly compute gM in polynomial time (e.g., as in Lemma 4);
otherwise, it can be computed approximately within a factor of 1 −  and with probability 1 − δ,
by sampling, in time polynomial in 1 and
1
δ .
Ex post implementation of feasible interim allocation rules. An ex post implementation
for any x ∈ X can be obtained exactly as in subsection 5.2.
Corollary 3. Any normalized interim allocation rule x ∈ X can be implemented by the random-
ized rank-based allocation mechanism (Definition 7) as a distribution over deterministic rank-based
allocation mechanisms (Definition 5).
6 Conclusions and Extensions
In this paper we have focused on binary allocation problems where an agent is either served or not
served. For these binary allocation problems distributions over allocations are given by a single
number, i.e., the probability that the agent is served. Our results can be extended to environments
with multi-unit demand when the agents utility is linear in the expected number of units the agent
receives.
In Section 5 we described algorithms for optimizing over feasible interim allocation rules and
for (ex post) implementation of the resulting rules. Neither these algorithms nor the generalization
of Border’s condition require the types of the agents to be independently distributed. However,
our formulation of incentive compatibility for interim allocation rules does require independence.
For correlated distributions the interim allocation rule is a function of the actual type of the agent
22
(which conditions the types of the other agents) and the reported type of the agent. Therefore, this
generalization of our theorem to correlated environments has little relevance for mechanism design.
The algorithms in Section 5 do not require the feasibility constraint to be known in advance.
A simple example where this generalization is interesting is a multi-unit auction where the supply
k is stochastically drawn from a known distribution. Our result shows that the optimal auction
in such an environment can be described by picking the random ordering on types and allocating
greedily by this ordering while supplies last. We do not know of many examples other than this
where this generalization is interesting.
Our techniques can also be used in conjunction with the approach of Cai et al. (2012) for solving
multi-item auction problems for agents with additive values.
One important extension of our work is to scenarios where the type space and distribution are
only available via oracle access (and can be very large or even infinite). Given a polynomial time
approximation scheme for a variant of the single agent problem we can construct a polynomial
time approximation scheme for the multi-agent problem. Such a model is important, for instance,
when the agents type space is multi-dimensional but succinctly describable, e.g., for unit demand
agents with independently distributed values for various items for sale. Such a type space would
be exponentially large in the number of items but succinctly described in polynomial space in the
number of items. While reduction can be applied to this scenario; however, we do not know of any
solution to the optimal single-agent problem with which to instantiate the reduction.
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A Proofs from Section 5.1
We first describe a network flow formulation of S, which is used to prove Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
A network flow formulation of S. We construct a network in which every feasible flow cor-
responds to some (y, z) ∈ S. The network (see Figure 1) has a source node 〈Src〉, a sink node
〈Snk〉, and n − i + 1 nodes for every ti ∈ TN labeled as 〈ti, i〉, · · · , 〈ti, n〉 where each node 〈ti′ , i〉
corresponds to the type ti′ at the time SSA algorithm is visiting agent i. For each ti′ ∈ TN and for
each i ∈ {i′, . . . , n− 1} there is an edge (〈ti′ , i〉, 〈ti′ , i+ 1〉) with infinite capacity whose flow is equal
to y(ti′ , i); we refer to these edges as “horizontal edges”. For every ti′ and every ti where i
′ < i
there is an edge (〈ti′ , i〉, 〈ti, i〉) whose flow is equal to z(ti′ , ti) and whose capacity is equal to the
total amount of flow that enters 〈ti′ , i〉 multiplied by fi(ti), i.e., it has a dynamic capacity which is
equal to y(ti′ , i− 1)fi(ti); we refer to these edges as “diagonal edges”. There is an edge (〈Src〉, t0)
through which the source node pushes exactly one unit of flow. Finally, for every ti ∈ TN , there
is an edge (〈ti, n〉, 〈Snk〉) with unlimited capacity whose flow is equal to y(ti, n). To simplify the
proofs we sometimes use 〈t0, 0〉 as an alias for the source node 〈Src〉 and 〈ti, n+ 1〉 as aliases for
the sink node 〈Snk〉. The network always has a feasible flow because all the flow can be routed
along the path 〈Src〉, 〈t0, 1〉, . . . , 〈t0, n〉, 〈Snk〉.
We define the residual capacity between two types ti′ , ti ∈ TN with respect to a given (y, z) ∈ S
as follows.
ResCapy,z(ti′ , ti) =

y(ti′ , i− 1)fi(ti)− z(ti′ , ti) i > i′
z(ti, ti′) i < i
′
0 otherwise
(ResCap)
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Figure 1: The flow network corresponding to the SSA algorithm 3. In this instance, there are
three agents with type spaces T1 = {a, b}, T2 = {c, d}, and T3 = {e, g}. All nodes in the same
row correspond to the same type. The diagonal edges have dynamic capacity constraints while all
other edges have no capacity constraints. The flow going from 〈ti′ , i〉 to 〈ti, i〉 corresponds to the
ex-ante probability of ti taking the token away from ti′ . The flow going from 〈ti′ , i〉 to 〈ti′ , i+ 1〉
corresponds to the ex-ante probability of ti′ still holding the token after agent i is visited.
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Due to dynamic capacity constraints, it is not possible to augment a flow along a path with posi-
tive residual capacity by simply changing the amount of the flow along the edges of the path, because
reducing the total flow entering a node also decreases the capacity of the diagonal edges leaving
that node, which could potentially violate their capacity constraints. Therefore, we introduce an
operator Reroute(ti′ , ti, ρ) (algorithm 1 and Figure 2) which modifies an existing (y, z) ∈ S, while
maintaining its feasibility, to transfer a ρ-fraction of y(ti, n) to y(ti′ , n) by changing the flow along
the cycle
〈Snk〉, 〈ti′ , n〉, 〈ti′ , n− 1〉, . . . , 〈ti′ ,max(i′, i)〉, 〈ti,max(i′, i)〉, . . . , 〈ti, n− 1〉, 〈ti, n〉, 〈Snk〉
and adjusting the flow of the the diagonal edges which leave this cycle. More precisely, Reroute(ti′ , ti, ρ)
takes out a ρ-fraction of the flow going through the subtree rooted at 〈ti′ ,max(i′, i)〉 11 and reassigns
it to the subtree rooted at 〈ti,max(i′, i)〉 (see Figure 2).
Algorithm 1 Reroute(ti′ , ti, ρ).
Input: An existing (y, z) ∈ S given implicitly, a source type ti′ ∈ TN , a destination type ti ∈ TN
where i′ 6= i, and a fraction ρ ∈ [0, 1].
Output: Modify (y, z) to transfer a ρ-fraction of y(ti′ , n) to y(ti, n) while ensuring that the modified
assignment is still in S.
1: if i′ < i then
2: Increase z(ti′ , ti) by ρ · y(ti′ , i).
3: else
4: Decrease z(ti, ti′) by ρ · y(ti′ , i′).
5: end if
6: for i′′ = max(i′, i) to n do
7: Increase y(ti, i
′′) by ρ · y(ti′ , i′′).
8: Decrease y(ti′ , i
′′) by ρ · y(ti′ , i′′).
9: end for
10: for ti′′ ∈ T{max(i′,i)+1,...,n} do
11: Increase z(ti, ti′′) by ρ · z(ti′ , ti′′).
12: Decrease z(ti′ , ti′′) by ρ · z(ti′ , ti′′).
13: end for
Proof of Lemma 1. For any given (y, z) ∈ S we show that it is always possible to modify y and z to
obtain a non-degenerate feasible assignment with the same induced interim allocation probabilities
(i.e., the same y(·, n)). Let d denote the number of degenerate types with respect to (y, z), i.e.,
define
d = #
{
ti ∈ T{1,...,n}
∣∣∣y(ti, n) = 0, y(ti, i) > 0}
The proof is by induction on d. The base case is d = 0 which is trivial. We prove the claim for
d > 0 by modifying y and z, reducing the number of degenerate types to d− 1, and then applying
the induction hypothesis. Let ti be a degenerate type. For each ti′ ∈ T{0,...,i−1}, we apply the
operator Reroute(ti, ti′ ,
z(ti′ ,ti)
y(ti,i)
) unless y(ti, i) has already reached 0. Applying this operator to
11This subtree consists of the path 〈ti′ ,max(i′, i)〉, . . . , 〈ti′ , n〉, 〈Snk〉 and all the diagonal edges leaving this path.
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Figure 2: Changes made by applying Reroute(t0, b, ρ). A ρ-fraction of the red subtree rooted
at t0 is take out and reassigned to the green subtree rooted at b. The exact amount of change is
indicated for each green and each red edge. The flow along all other edges stay intact. The operator
has the effect of reassigning ρ-fraction of ex-ante probability of allocation for type t0 to type b.
each type ti′ eliminates the flow from 〈ti′ , i〉 to 〈ti, i〉, so eventually y(ti, i) reaches 0 and ti is no
longer degenerate and also no new degenerate type is introduced, so the number of degenerate types
is reduced to d − 1. It is also easy to see that y(ti′ , n) is not modified because y(ti, n) = 0. That
completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2. To prove the lemma it is enough to show that for any augmentable type ti′
and any non-augmentable type ti, ResCapy,z(ti′ , ti) = 0 which is equivalent to the statement of
the lemma (the equivalence follows from the definition of ResCap and equation (pi)). The proof
is by contradiction. Suppose ti′ is augmentable and ResCapy,z(ti′ , ti) = δ for some positive δ; we
show that ti is also augmentable. Since ti′ is augmentable, there exists a (y
′, z′) ∈ S such that
y′(τ, n) = y(τ, n) for all τ ∈ TN \ {t0, ti′} and y′(ti′ , n)− y(ti′ , n) =  > 0. Define
(y′′, z′′) = (1− α) · (y, z) + α · (y′, z′)
where α ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter that we specify later. Note that in (y′′, z′′), ti′ is augmented by α,
and ResCapy′′,z′′(ti′ , ti) ≥ (1 − α)δ, and (y′′, z′′) ∈ S because it is a convex combination of (y, z)
and (y′, z′). Consider applying Reroute(ti′ , ti, ρ) to (y′′, z′′) for some parameter ρ ∈ [0, 1]. The
idea is to choose α and ρ such that the exact amount, by which ti′ was augmented, gets reassigned
to ti, by applying Reroute(ti′ , ti, ρ); so that eventually ti is augmented while every other type
(except t0) has the same allocation probabilities as they originally had in (y, z). It is easy to verify
that by setting
α =
y(ti′ , n)δ
2
ρ =
δ
2 + δ
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we get a feasible assignment in which the allocation probability of ti is augmented by α while every
other type (except t0) has the same allocation probabilities as in (y, z). We still need to show that
α > 0. The proof is again by contradiction. Suppose α = 0, so it must be y(ti′ , n) = 0, which would
imply that ti′ is a degenerate type because y(ti′ , i
′) > 0 (because ResCapy,z(ti′ , ti) > 0), however
(y, z) is a non-degenerate assignment by the hypothesis of the lemma, which is a contradiction.
That completes the proof.
B Proofs from Section 5.2
〈𝑆𝑟𝑐〉 
〈𝑆𝑛𝑘〉 
𝐟(𝐭) 
𝐟(𝐭) 
𝑘 ⋅ 𝐟(𝐭) 𝐭 
𝑇𝑛 
𝑇1 
𝑡1 
𝑡𝑛  
𝑥 (𝑡1) 
𝑥 (𝑡𝑛) 
𝐓 
Figure 3: The bipartite graph used in the max-flow/min-cut argument of the proof of Theorem 3.
The capacities are indicated on the edges.
Rest of the proof of Theorem 3. We give a proof of Pgk ⊆ X based on the min-cut/max-flow the-
orem. We start by constructing a directed bipartite graph as illustrated in Figure 3. On one side
we put a node 〈t〉, for each type profile t ∈ T. On the other side we put a node 〈ti〉, for each type
ti ∈ T{1,...,n}. We also add a source node 〈Src〉 and a sink node 〈Snk〉. We add a directed edge
from 〈Src〉 to the node 〈t〉, for each t ∈ T and set the capacity of this edge to k · f(t). We also add
n outgoing edges for every node 〈t〉, each one going to one of the nodes 〈t1〉, . . . , 〈tn〉 and with a
capacity of f(t). Finally we add a directed edge from the node 〈ti〉, for each ti ∈ T{1,...,n}, to 〈Snk〉
with capacity of x(ti). Consider a maximum flow from 〈Src〉 to 〈Snk〉. It is easy to see that there
exists a feasible ex post implementation for x if and only if all the edges to the sink node 〈Snk〉 are
saturated. In particular, if ρ(t, ti) denotes the amount of flow from 〈t〉 to 〈ti〉, a feasible ex post
implementation can be obtained by allocating to each type ti with probability ρ(t, ti)/f(t) when
the type profile t is reported by the agents.
We show that if a feasible ex post implementation does not exist, then x 6∈ Pgk . Observe that
if a feasible ex post implementation does not exist, then some of the incoming edges of 〈Snk〉 are
not saturated by the max-flow. Let (A,B) be a minimum cut such that 〈Src〉 ∈ A and 〈Snk〉 ∈ B.
Let B′ = B ∩ TN . We show that the polymatroid inequality
x(B′) ≤ gk(B′) (7)
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must have been violated. It is easy to see that the size of the cut is given by the following equation.
Cut(A,B) =
∑
t∈T∩A
# {i|ti ∈ B} f(t) +
∑
t∈T∩B
k · f(t) +
∑
τ∈TN∩A
x(τ)
Observe that for each t ∈ T ∩ A, it must be that #{i|ti ∈ B} ≤ k, otherwise moving 〈t〉 to B
would decrease the size of the cut. So the size of the minimum cut can be in simply written as:
Cut(A,B) =
∑
t∈T
min
(
# {i|ti ∈ B} , k
)
f(t) +
∑
τ∈TN∩A
x(τ)
On the other hand, since some of the incoming edges of 〈Snk〉 are not saturated by the max-flow,
it must be that ∑
τ∈TN
x(τ) = Cut(A ∪B − 〈Snk〉, 〈Snk〉) > Cut(A,B),
so ∑
τ∈TN∩B
x(τ) >
∑
t∈T
min
(
# {i|ti ∈ B} , k
)
f(t).
The right hand side of the above inequality is the same as Et∼f [min(#{i|ti ∈ B}, k)] which shows
that polymatroid inequality (7) of Pgk is violated so x 6∈ Pgk . That completes the proof.
C Proofs from Section 5.3
Proof of Lemma 4. Assuming that agents are independent (i.e., assuming f(·) is a product distri-
bution), gk(S) can be computed in time O((n + |S|) · k) using the following dynamic program in
which Gij denotes the probability of the event that min(|t ∩ S ∩ T{1,...,i}|, k) = j.
gk(S) =
k∑
j=1
j ·Gnj
Gij =

Gi−1k + (
∑
ti∈S∩Ti fi(ti)) ·Gi−1k−1 1 ≤ i ≤ n, j = k
Gi−1j + (
∑
ti∈S∩Ti fi(ti)) · (Gi−1j−1 −Gi−1j ) 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 0 ≤ j < k
1 i = 0, j = 0
0 otherwise
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